Central African Republic: Deadliest civilian targeting by Russian mercenaries in more than a year

In March, Russian mercenaries carried out numerous attacks on mining sites in Kotabara and Zaranga, Ouham prefecture, reportedly killing around 60 civilians, injuring others, and forcing survivors to carry stolen goods and gold. While civilian targeting events by the Wagner Group have been higher in past months, March was the most deadly for civilians since February 2022, when Wagner was engaged in a counter-offensive against rebel groups. Since the arrival of the Wagner Group — rebranded as Africa Corps throughout the continent following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and changes to key leadership closer to Russia’s Defense Ministry¹ — in the Central African Republic, numerous operations aim to gain control over strategic mining areas (for more, see ACLED’s Moving Out of the Shadows). During efforts to overtake mining sites, the Wagner Group often targets civilians with deadly violence. Russian mercenaries have reportedly killed over 900 civilians, making them the armed group that has killed the most civilians in CAR since December 2020.

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Kenya: Surge in al-Shabaab violence

Although al-Shabaab’s activity in Kenya had been trending downward since October 2023, this changed in March with a spike in militant events. ACLED records at least a dozen violent events involving al-Shabaab last month, resulting in at least 29 reported fatalities and marking March as the deadliest month since September 2023. Over half of the violence involved battles with state forces, as al-Shabaab aimed to disrupt military convoys heading toward Somalia and attack police stations in the northern counties. Militants planted numerous IEDs, which destroyed military vehicles in a convoy near Shangaani, Lamu county, and led to at least 18 reported fatalities. The upswing in al-Shabaab activity took place as Somalia gained full membership in the East African Community (EAC) on 4 March, but reopening the border with Kenya remains in the distance (for more, see ACLED’s Kenya: Demonstrations, Gangs, and Kenya-Somalia Relations). The Kenyan government closed the border with Somalia in 2011 to curb cross-border violence by al-Shabaab.²

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Nigeria: Mass kidnappings by bandits in Kaduna and Sokoto states

Large-scale kidnappings continued last month in Nigeria in the North West region. Between 7 and 12 March in Kaduna and Sokoto states, bandits — a diverse grouping of armed actors operating under different leaders — abducted hundreds of people, including many children. In March, the number of abduction events more than doubled in Kaduna but remained lower than the previous month in Sokoto. Several factors may drive the recent mass kidnappings, including the increased revenue of group abductions over individual kidnappings for ransom, leveraging Ramadan for higher ransoms from the government, and using abductees in prisoner exchanges with detained members of bandit groups (for more, see this brief jointly produced with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime). In efforts to retrieve the abducted children, the federal government invited Sheikh Ahmad Gumi, an Islamic cleric in Kaduna state, to facilitate dialogue with bandit leaders.³

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South Africa: Surge in KwaZulu-Natal demonstrations

Ahead of the May presidential election, demonstrations increased by more than 20% in March from the previous month in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province — with many gathering to share concerns over power outages and salary increases.⁴ March marked the third consecutive month of increased demonstrations in KZN province, with most events concentrated in Durban’s urban area. Major political parties have been echoing these popular grievances, also emphasizing employment, an end to load shedding, and solutions to address the high cost of living.⁵ The ruling ANC party faces declining support in KZN province, which is home to almost 21% of the registered population.⁶ Concerningly, riots more than doubled last month compared to February. A strategic political battleground even before the end of apartheid in 1994, KZN province has also been the epicenter of violence targeting local government officials in South Africa.

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Sudan: The SAF continue to regain strategic areas in Greater Khartoum

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continued to retake control of areas in greater Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in March. ACLED records 15 incidents of the SAF capturing territory in greater Khartoum in March, continuing an upward trajectory in the number of such events since January. The SAF primarily regained territory in areas of Omdurman. Strategically, the military forces retook the national radio and television broadcasting headquarters in the al-Mulazmin neighborhood and cut the RSF supply line crossing the Nile river. The RSF focus on areas outside Khartoum — notably Kordofan, al-Jazirah, and Darfur — shifted resources away from defending positions in Omdurman, where its forces became increasingly surrounded by the SAF (for more, see Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan). While the RSF made strong advances in the last quarter of 2023 and overtook swaths of territory — primarily in Darfur, Kordofan, and al-Jazirah — these advances have slowed substantially in 2024.

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Brazil: Arrests provide insight into Marielle Franco’s assassination

In a significant development concerning the 2018 killing of City Councilwoman Marielle Franco, the Brazilian federal police arrested three Rio de Janeiro officials on 24 March. The arrests mark a turning point in the investigation into Franco’s assassination, shedding light on alleged connections between Rio’s political elite and criminal militias. The arrested individuals include federal Congressman Chiquinho Brazão and his brother, state auditor Domingos Brazão, on accusations that they ordered Franco’s murder, and former Civil Police Chief Rivaldo Barbosa, for allegedly obstructing the investigation.¹ The arrests come after a former militia leader implicated in the killing, Ronnie Lessa, cooperated with authorities and revealed that Franco’s opposition to a bill legalizing militias’ illegal constructions was a potential motive for her assassination.² Militias are often composed of former and current police officers, who hold longstanding ties to politicians, wield significant power in Rio, and have been involved in almost 9,000 events of violence in Rio de Janeiro since 2018.

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Colombia: The government’s suspension of its ceasefire with the FARC-EMC triggers deadly clashes

On 17 March, the government suspended the bilateral ceasefire with FARC dissidents from the Central General Staff (EMC), resuming military operations against the group.³ The decision came after the EMC’s Dagoberto Ramos faction killed a woman social leader and injured several people during an attack targeting a Nasa Indigenous community, which was opposing the forced recruitment of a teenager in Toribío, Cauca. The government deployed more than 32,000 troops to confront the group in the Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño departments.⁴ In response, on 1 April, the EMC announced the creation of a new armed unit that will operate in the Valle del Cauca, Huila, Tolima, and Quindío departments.⁵

Following the suspension of the ceasefire, clashes between FARC dissidents and security forces increased, resulting in at least 11 reported fatalities between 20 and 31 March, especially in the Cañón del Micay area in the Cauca department, a strategic corridor for coca production. The disruption of talks with the EMC could prompt heightened political violence levels in the upcoming months, even as another key conflict actor, the Gulf Clan, has opened to the possibility of engaging in peace talks with the government.⁶ Clashes between security forces and FARC dissident groups had dropped since the government agreed on a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC in October 2023. However, violence targeting civilians involving FARC dissidents continued, challenging the effectiveness of President Gustavo Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ plan, which aims to negotiate peace with armed groups and address social issues fueling Colombia’s longstanding conflict.

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Cuba: Power outages spark unrest amid worsening socioeconomic conditions

Constant power outages triggered a spike in demonstrations in March, reaching the highest number of such events recorded in a month since October 2022. Demonstrations started early in March and intensified on 17 March, taking place in at least eight provinces. Demonstrators took to the streets to demand solutions for the energy problems, also shouting anti-government slogans and denouncing food scarcity and the increasing cost of living.⁷ In Holguín and Cienfuegos provinces, rioters threw stones at stores and government buildings. Meanwhile, police intervened in over half of the 16 demonstrations recorded in March. According to the Spanish human rights NGO Prisoners Defenders, around 38 participants were arrested on 17 March for alleged vandalism and contempt for authority.⁸ The collapse of Cuba’s energy system, mainly caused by poor infrastructure and fuel scarcity,⁹ has led to demonstrations in the past, including a surge in activity between August and October 2022. The recent demonstrations follow a government decision to increase fuel and energy prices as a measure to face the country’s economic downturn.¹⁰

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Ecuador: Attacks targeting politicians continue amid enduring gang-related violence

During March, local government officials were targeted in at least five violent incidents in Manabí and Guayas. In Manabí, on 24 March, gunmen shot and killed the mayor of San Vicente, Brigitte García, and her communications director, as well as the husband of the local government’s treasurer. In Guayas, unidentified armed assailants shot at the house of the mayor of the Balzar municipality, and an alternate council member of the Samborondón local government died of a heart attack while he was being kidnapped. Although the identity of the perpetrators remains unknown, violence targeting political figures is often attributed to gangs, who seek to pressure officials and secure their illicit activities.¹¹ 

The violence came amid persistent gang targeting of civilians, including a series of attacks that reportedly killed at least 80 people in the span of a weekend at the end of March.¹² These events underscore the still-pervasive influence of gangs in the country, despite a state of emergency declared by President Daniel Noboa to combat gang violence, which has led to the arrest of at least 13,000 suspected gang members since January.¹³ Ecuador’s coastal departments, including Manabí and Guayas, have been the epicenter of disputes between gangs for the control of drug trafficking activities in recent years.¹⁴ Gangs have also sought to co-opt local and even national authorities through bribes and direct attacks, translating into a string of political killings, including the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio in August 2023.

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 Haiti: Gangs’ offensive forces Prime Minister Henry to resign and start political transition

Coordinated gang attacks against government buildings and infrastructure in Port-au-Prince intensified throughout March. In early March, gangs targeted structures including the National Palace, several police stations, the airport, and the city’s main port, impeding Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s return from Kenya, where he was negotiating the creation of a United Nations-approved multinational police mission. Gangs also raided the National Penitentiary on 2 March, causing at least 30 reported deaths and the escape of more than 3,000 inmates.¹⁵ Following this attack, the government imposed a 72-hour state of emergency on 3 March in the Ouest department, then extended it until 3 April.¹⁶

Unable to return to the country, Henry announced that he would step down after the establishment of a nine-member transitional council in charge of appointing the next interim prime minister, a council of ministers, and organizing the upcoming elections. The solution was proposed during a meeting between members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and other partners, such as the UN, United States, France, Brazil, and Canada.¹⁷ The leader of the opposition Platfòm Pitit Desalin party, Jean Charles Moïse, initially rejected the initiative, claiming it was a solution imposed from outside the country, but eventually joined the council.¹⁸

Despite Henry’s resignation and the setting of a transitional plan, gang violence continued at a high level in March. Compared with the previous month, violent events rose in the Port-au-Prince arrondissement. This violence also grew notably deadlier in the wealthy neighborhoods of Pétion-Ville, where the targeting of civilians reportedly led to at least 10 fatalities, doubling the number recorded in February. Police responded to the attacks with interventions in Pétion-Ville between 19 and 26 March that led to the reported deaths of about 20 gang members. Amid this chaos, ACLED records several vigilante incidents, with members of the Bwa Kale movement reportedly behind the lynching and killing of several gang members.¹⁹

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Jamaica: Gang rivalries drive an increase in violence

Violence levels reached a peak in March in Westmoreland and Saint Catherine parishes, with at least 11 recorded events, contributing to a 36% general increase in violence in the country compared to the month prior. In Westmoreland, the increase was driven by a series of attacks by unidentified gang members that left six dead in March in Grange Hill and Little London municipalities. The attacks occur amid a dispute between the Ants Posse Gang and King Valley Gang for the control of criminal activities, including extortion and lottery scamming.²⁰ Similarly, in Saint Catherine, targeted attacks against civilians prompted an increase in violence, including two attacks in Central Village between 11 and 12 March that resulted in five reported fatalities. In response to the increasing violence in the country, police have imposed several temporary curfews. In March, the government implemented curfews in sections of Westmoreland, Saint Catherine, Kingston, and Clarendon parishes.

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Gaza: UN Security Council calls for immediate ceasefire amid looming Israeli ground operation into Rafah

In March, the number of political violence events and reported fatalities decreased in the Gaza Strip compared to the month prior. In the north of Gaza, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) completed ground operations in al-Zaytun neighborhood by mid-March before launching a two-week campaign targeting al-Shifa hospital and its surrounding area in the Southern Rimal neighborhood of Gaza City. The IDF had previously taken control of the hospital in November 2023, destroying an underground tunnel network that it claimed was used by Hamas as a command center. Following the IDF’s withdrawal from the city in January, Hamas militants had regrouped and were allegedly operating from inside the hospital.¹ At least 12 armed clashes broke out across the campus during the second half of March, leading to the death of nearly 200 Palestinian militants. 

Meanwhile, in Gaza’s southern Khan Yunis governorate, clashes continued, though at reduced rates, in Hamad City, al-Qarara, Abasan al-Kabira, Amal neighborhood, and areas near the Nasser hospital. In Rafah, the IDF continued launching airstrikes, but an anticipated ground invasion did not begin amid intense international pressure — most importantly from the US, which chose not to veto a Gaza ceasefire resolution at the United Nations on 25 March.² While Israeli officials insist that the IDF remains determined to invade Rafah,³ where Hamas still has four battalions,⁴ the timing and intensity of the operation may yet be influenced by diplomatic efforts. Truce talks between Israel and Hamas resumed in Cairo in early April, in the latest attempt to bring a pause to nearly six months of war in Gaza.

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Iraq: Tribal violence in southern Iraq  

In March, tribal violence reintensified in the southern provinces of Thi Qar, al-Basra, and Maysan following a lull in activity in February. In Thi Qar province, deadly tribal clashes between al-Rumaid and al-Omari tribes on 3 March led to the death of the head of the province’s intelligence and counter-terrorism unit following an intervention by security forces. Iraqi security forces clashed with militants from the involved tribes and arrested 123 individuals. The arrests triggered subsequent protests demanding their release. The same warring tribes have been in conflict since April 2023, resulting in dozens of casualties and approximately 115 families displaced,⁵ despite reaching a truce mediated by prominent religious leader Ali al-Sistani in October 2023.⁶ In addition to Thi Qar, at least three were wounded in tribally motivated clashes and attacks on civilians reportedly left five people dead in al-Basra and Maysan provinces.

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Lebanon and Syria: Israel escalates its campaign against Hezbollah

Fears over the Israel and Hamas conflict spilling over into a broader regional war continue to run high. While attacks and counter-attacks involving United States forces in Iraq and Syria nearly ceased in March, hostilities between Israel and Iran-backed members of the ‘axis of resistance’ in Syria and Lebanon continued to escalate. On 29 March, the IDF conducted its deadliest attack in Syria in years, hitting multiple targets, including a Hezbollah rocket depot in Aleppo. The airstrikes reportedly left 36 regime soldiers, seven Hezbollah fighters, and another three pro-Iran militants dead. Israel has carried out hundreds of strikes on targets in government-controlled areas in Syria in recent years, but its military campaign against Iran-backed groups has intensified since 7 October and may now be increasingly focusing on Hezbollah and its assets.

Hezbollah and Israel have engaged in daily exchanges of fire along the Israeli-Lebanese border in the past six months. The IDF killed at least two senior commanders of Hezbollah’s anti-tank missile unit in drone strikes on 29 and 31 March in southern Lebanon. On 11 and 12 March, Israeli jets conducted several airstrikes deep inside Lebanon, while on 26 March, Hezbollah positions were targeted in northeastern Lebanon near Ras Baalbek and Hermel. These events mark the deepest raids inside Lebanon since the October hostilities broke out. In a recent interview, Israel’s Defense Minister Yoav Gallant suggested that the IDF was expanding its campaign against Hezbollah and “turning from defending to pursuing” the Lebanese Shiite group.⁷

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Syria: Protests break out in rebel-held areas

In northwestern Syria, growing public anger toward Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) triggered more than 80 protests in at least 28 towns and villages across rebel-held areas in Idleb and Aleppo provinces in March. The protesters denounced HTS and demanded its leader, Muhammad al-Jawlani, be overthrown. The protests were sparked by the torture and killing of a member of the Jaysh al-Ahrar opposition group in an HTS prison on 24 February. The arrest and killing of the fighter was part of an HTS campaign to crack down on alleged collaborators with the Syrian regime and foreign entities. HTS launched the campaign last year, arbitrarily detaining and disappearing hundreds of civilians and fighters, including commanders of HTS. HTS, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, is the largest Sunni Islamist political and militant group operating in northwestern Syria. Since 2020, the group has controlled the rebel-held areas in Idleb, which is home to more than 3 million people — the majority of whom are displaced from other parts of Syria. The group also operates in parts of Aleppo’s western countryside, the Lattakia mountains, and al-Ghab Plain in northwestern Hama.

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Yemen: Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden lead to their first fatalities

The increased intensity of Houthi maritime attacks in the second half of February continued into March. On 6 March, Houthi attacks led to their first fatalities, killing three crew members of the True Confidence bulk carrier in the Gulf of Aden. This was followed by the largest swarm attack against US warships to date on 9 March, with Houthi forces claiming to have launched 37 drones at US warships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.⁸The US claimed that a total of 28 drones were shot down in the two waterways,⁹ in an engagement that involved the British, Danish, French, and US navies. Throughout the month, Houthi attacks were also intercepted by the German, Greek, and Italian navies, evidence of increased European Union engagement following the launch of Operation Aspides in February.

In the second half of March, Houthi attacks saw a notable decline, despite the Houthi leadership vowing to extend attacks to the Indian Ocean and threatening traffic through the Cape of Good Hope on 14 March.¹⁰ Almost two-thirds of Houthi maritime attacks for the whole month were recorded between 1 and 15 March. This decline also coincided with a drop in US strikes on Houthi weaponry and associated infrastructure inside Yemen, possibly indicating that the Houthi arsenal is depleting or that back-channel talks are taking place. 

For more, see the Red Sea attacks interactive map as part of the Yemen Conflict Observatory.

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