Regional Overview
Africa
March 2024
Posted: 8 April 2024
Central African Republic: Deadliest civilian targeting by Russian mercenaries in more than a year
In March, Russian mercenaries carried out numerous attacks on mining sites in Kotabara and Zaranga, Ouham prefecture, reportedly killing around 60 civilians, injuring others, and forcing survivors to carry stolen goods and gold. While civilian targeting events by the Wagner Group have been higher in past months, March was the most deadly for civilians since February 2022, when Wagner was engaged in a counter-offensive against rebel groups. Since the arrival of the Wagner Group — rebranded as Africa Corps throughout the continent following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and changes to key leadership closer to Russia’s Defense Ministry1Nicodemus Minde, ‘Russia’s Africa Corps – more than old wine in a new bottle,’ Institute for Security Studies, 7 March 2024; John Lechner and Sergey Eledinov, ‘Is Africa Corps a Rebranded Wagner Group?’ Foreign Policy, 7 February 2024 — in the Central African Republic, numerous operations aim to gain control over strategic mining areas (for more, see ACLED’s Moving Out of the Shadows). During efforts to overtake mining sites, the Wagner Group often targets civilians with deadly violence. Russian mercenaries have reportedly killed over 900 civilians, making them the armed group that has killed the most civilians in CAR since December 2020.
Kenya: Surge in al-Shabaab violence
Although al-Shabaab’s activity in Kenya had been trending downward since October 2023, this changed in March with a spike in militant events. ACLED records at least a dozen violent events involving al-Shabaab last month, resulting in at least 29 reported fatalities and marking March as the deadliest month since September 2023. Over half of the violence involved battles with state forces, as al-Shabaab aimed to disrupt military convoys heading toward Somalia and attack police stations in the northern counties. Militants planted numerous IEDs, which destroyed military vehicles in a convoy near Shangaani, Lamu county, and led to at least 18 reported fatalities. The upswing in al-Shabaab activity took place as Somalia gained full membership in the East African Community (EAC) on 4 March, but reopening the border with Kenya remains in the distance (for more, see ACLED’s Kenya: Demonstrations, Gangs, and Kenya-Somalia Relations). The Kenyan government closed the border with Somalia in 2011 to curb cross-border violence by al-Shabaab.2Africa News, ‘Kenya postpones reopening of border with Somalia,’ 7 May 2023
Nigeria: Mass kidnappings by bandits in Kaduna and Sokoto states
Large-scale kidnappings continued last month in Nigeria in the North West region. Between 7 and 12 March in Kaduna and Sokoto states, bandits — a diverse grouping of armed actors operating under different leaders — abducted hundreds of people, including many children. In March, the number of abduction events more than doubled in Kaduna but remained lower than the previous month in Sokoto. Several factors may drive the recent mass kidnappings, including the increased revenue of group abductions over individual kidnappings for ransom, leveraging Ramadan for higher ransoms from the government, and using abductees in prisoner exchanges with detained members of bandit groups (for more, see this brief jointly produced with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime). In efforts to retrieve the abducted children, the federal government invited Sheikh Ahmad Gumi, an Islamic cleric in Kaduna state, to facilitate dialogue with bandit leaders.3Adekunle Sulaimon, ‘UPDATED: FG invites Gumi for questioning on bandits’ activities,’ Nigeria Punch, 25 March 2024
South Africa: Surge in KwaZulu-Natal demonstrations
Ahead of the May presidential election, demonstrations increased by more than 20% in March from the previous month in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province — with many gathering to share concerns over power outages and salary increases.4Kopano Gumbi and Sfundo Parakozov, ‘South African economy ‘moving sideways’ months before election,’ Reuters, 5 March 2024 March marked the third consecutive month of increased demonstrations in KZN province, with most events concentrated in Durban’s urban area. Major political parties have been echoing these popular grievances, also emphasizing employment, an end to load shedding, and solutions to address the high cost of living.5Simnikiwe Mzekandaba, ‘Political parties make tech a key feature in manifestos,’ IT Web, 26 February 2024 The ruling ANC party faces declining support in KZN province, which is home to almost 21% of the registered population.6Inside Politic, ‘KwaZulu-Natal – political battleground for the heart and soul of South Africa,’ 17 March 2024 Concerningly, riots more than doubled last month compared to February. A strategic political battleground even before the end of apartheid in 1994, KZN province has also been the epicenter of violence targeting local government officials in South Africa.
Sudan: The SAF continue to regain strategic areas in Greater Khartoum
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continued to retake control of areas in greater Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in March. ACLED records 15 incidents of the SAF capturing territory in greater Khartoum in March, continuing an upward trajectory in the number of such events since January. The SAF primarily regained territory in areas of Omdurman. Strategically, the military forces retook the national radio and television broadcasting headquarters in the al-Mulazmin neighborhood and cut the RSF supply line crossing the Nile river. The RSF focus on areas outside Khartoum — notably Kordofan, al-Jazirah, and Darfur — shifted resources away from defending positions in Omdurman, where its forces became increasingly surrounded by the SAF (for more, see Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan). While the RSF made strong advances in the last quarter of 2023 and overtook swaths of territory — primarily in Darfur, Kordofan, and al-Jazirah — these advances have slowed substantially in 2024.
See more
See the Codebook and the User Guide for an overview of ACLED’s core methodology. For additional documentation, check the Resource Library. Region-specific methodology briefs can be accessed below.
Links:
For additional resources and in-depth updates on the latest political violence and protest trends, check our local observatories for Mozambique and Ethiopia, as well as our special Nigeria Election Violence Tracker project.