Regional Overview
Latin America & the Caribbean
March 2024
Posted: 8 April 2024
Brazil: Arrests provide insight into Marielle Franco’s assassination
In a significant development concerning the 2018 killing of City Councilwoman Marielle Franco, the Brazilian federal police arrested three Rio de Janeiro officials on 24 March. The arrests mark a turning point in the investigation into Franco’s assassination, shedding light on alleged connections between Rio’s political elite and criminal militias. The arrested individuals include federal Congressman Chiquinho Brazão and his brother, state auditor Domingos Brazão, on accusations that they ordered Franco’s murder, and former Civil Police Chief Rivaldo Barbosa, for allegedly obstructing the investigation.1Jack Nicas and Flávia Milhorance, ‘Police Say They’ve Cracked Rio de Janeiro’s Most Notorious Murder Mystery,’ New York Times, 24 March 2024; Wilson Tosta, ‘Quem é Rivaldo Barbosa, ex-chefe da Polícia Civil preso pela PF no caso Marielle Franco,’ BBC News Brasil, 24 March 2024; Aguirre Talento, Ana Paula Bimbati, Lorena Barros, Saulo Pereira Guimarães, Abinoan Santiago, ‘Polícia Federal prende suspeitos de mandar matar Marielle Franco,’ UOL, 24 March 2024 The arrests come after a former militia leader implicated in the killing, Ronnie Lessa, cooperated with authorities and revealed that Franco’s opposition to a bill legalizing militias’ illegal constructions was a potential motive for her assassination.2O Globo, ‘Quem são Chiquinho e Domingos Brazão, irmãos presos pela PF suspeitos de serem mandantes da morte de Marielle,’ 24 March 2024 Militias are often composed of former and current police officers, who hold longstanding ties to politicians, wield significant power in Rio, and have been involved in almost 9,000 events of violence in Rio de Janeiro since 2018.
Colombia: The government’s suspension of its ceasefire with the FARC-EMC triggers deadly clashes
On 17 March, the government suspended the bilateral ceasefire with FARC dissidents from the Central General Staff (EMC), resuming military operations against the group.3Liz Castrellón and Camilo Álvarez, ‘Diálogo de paz entre gobierno de Petro y disidencia de las FARC, en crisis tras ataque a comunidad indígena,’ Voz de América, 21 March 2024 The decision came after the EMC’s Dagoberto Ramos faction killed a woman social leader and injured several people during an attack targeting a Nasa Indigenous community, which was opposing the forced recruitment of a teenager in Toribío, Cauca. The government deployed more than 32,000 troops to confront the group in the Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño departments.4Óscar Solarte, ‘Fuerzas Militares activaron la Operación Mantus contra el Estado Mayor Central de las Farc,’ Caracol Radio, 24 March 2024; El Colombiano, ‘Un líder asesinado y enfrentamientos tras primeras horas de levantamiento del cese al fuego con disidencias del EMC,’ 20 March 2024 In response, on 1 April, the EMC announced the creation of a new armed unit that will operate in the Valle del Cauca, Huila, Tolima, and Quindío departments.5Armando Neira, ‘’Mordisco” crea nuevo bloque: en plena “paz total”, disidencia saltó de 15 a 19 departamentos,’ El Tiempo, 2 April 2024
Following the suspension of the ceasefire, clashes between FARC dissidents and security forces increased, resulting in at least 11 reported fatalities between 20 and 31 March, especially in the Cañón del Micay area in the Cauca department, a strategic corridor for coca production. The disruption of talks with the EMC could prompt heightened political violence levels in the upcoming months, even as another key conflict actor, the Gulf Clan, has opened to the possibility of engaging in peace talks with the government.6El Espectador, ‘Clan del Golfo acepta invitación de Petro para sentarse a una negociación de paz,’ 19 March 2024 Clashes between security forces and FARC dissident groups had dropped since the government agreed on a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC in October 2023. However, violence targeting civilians involving FARC dissidents continued, challenging the effectiveness of President Gustavo Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ plan, which aims to negotiate peace with armed groups and address social issues fueling Colombia’s longstanding conflict.
Cuba: Power outages spark unrest amid worsening socioeconomic conditions
Constant power outages triggered a spike in demonstrations in March, reaching the highest number of such events recorded in a month since October 2022. Demonstrations started early in March and intensified on 17 March, taking place in at least eight provinces. Demonstrators took to the streets to demand solutions for the energy problems, also shouting anti-government slogans and denouncing food scarcity and the increasing cost of living.7Carla Gloria Colomé, ‘Comida, corriente y libertad: la protesta ciudadana se reactiva en Cuba,’ El País, 25 March 2024 In Holguín and Cienfuegos provinces, rioters threw stones at stores and government buildings. Meanwhile, police intervened in over half of the 16 demonstrations recorded in March. According to the Spanish human rights NGO Prisoners Defenders, around 38 participants were arrested on 17 March for alleged vandalism and contempt for authority.8Dave Sherwood and Alien Fernandez, ‘Amid blackouts and scarce food, Cuba protests rattle ‘cradle’ of the Revolution,’ Reuters, ‘Entre apagones y escasez de alimentos, las protestas en Cuba sacuden la “cuna” de la Revolución,’ El Economista, 27 March 2024 The collapse of Cuba’s energy system, mainly caused by poor infrastructure and fuel scarcity,9Center for Democracy in the America, ‘La Crisis de Energía en Cuba: Entrevista con Jorge Piñon,’ September 2023 has led to demonstrations in the past, including a surge in activity between August and October 2022. The recent demonstrations follow a government decision to increase fuel and energy prices as a measure to face the country’s economic downturn.10Associated Press, ‘Rige en Cuba aumento en el precio de los combustibles y servicios básicos,’ 1 March 2024
Ecuador: Attacks targeting politicians continue amid enduring gang-related violence
During March, local government officials were targeted in at least five violent incidents in Manabí and Guayas. In Manabí, on 24 March, gunmen shot and killed the mayor of San Vicente, Brigitte García, and her communications director, as well as the husband of the local government’s treasurer. In Guayas, unidentified armed assailants shot at the house of the mayor of the Balzar municipality, and an alternate council member of the Samborondón local government died of a heart attack while he was being kidnapped. Although the identity of the perpetrators remains unknown, violence targeting political figures is often attributed to gangs, who seek to pressure officials and secure their illicit activities.11Anastasia Austin, ‘Plata o Plomo: Ecuador’s Public Servants in Gangs’ Crosshairs,’ InSight Crime, 27 March 2024
The violence came amid persistent gang targeting of civilians, including a series of attacks that reportedly killed at least 80 people in the span of a weekend at the end of March.12Carolina Mella, ‘80 asesinatos en tres días: las matanzas vuelven a atemorizar a Ecuador,’ El País, 2 April 2024 These events underscore the still-pervasive influence of gangs in the country, despite a state of emergency declared by President Daniel Noboa to combat gang violence, which has led to the arrest of at least 13,000 suspected gang members since January.13Alexandra Valencia and Oliver Griffin, ‘What is happening in Ecuador and why is it so dangerous now?,’ Reuters, 27 March 2024 Ecuador’s coastal departments, including Manabí and Guayas, have been the epicenter of disputes between gangs for the control of drug trafficking activities in recent years.14Chris Dalby, ‘GameChangers 2023: Ecuador Loses Its Grip on Crime,’ InSight Crime, 4 January 2024 Gangs have also sought to co-opt local and even national authorities through bribes and direct attacks, translating into a string of political killings, including the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio in August 2023.
Haiti: Gangs’ offensive forces Prime Minister Henry to resign and start political transition
Coordinated gang attacks against government buildings and infrastructure in Port-au-Prince intensified throughout March. In early March, gangs targeted structures including the National Palace, several police stations, the airport, and the city’s main port, impeding Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s return from Kenya, where he was negotiating the creation of a United Nations-approved multinational police mission. Gangs also raided the National Penitentiary on 2 March, causing at least 30 reported deaths and the escape of more than 3,000 inmates.15Henry Astier and Gianluca Avignia, ‘Haiti violence: Haiti gangs demand PM resign after mass jailbreak,’ BBC, 4 March 2024 Following this attack, the government imposed a 72-hour state of emergency on 3 March in the Ouest department, then extended it until 3 April.16La Croix,’Haïti : l’état d’urgence prolongé, le système de santé « proche de l’effondrement » selon l’ONU,’ 7 March 2024
Unable to return to the country, Henry announced that he would step down after the establishment of a nine-member transitional council in charge of appointing the next interim prime minister, a council of ministers, and organizing the upcoming elections. The solution was proposed during a meeting between members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and other partners, such as the UN, United States, France, Brazil, and Canada.17France 24, ‘Haiti transitional council plan appears to crumble after political parties reject it,’ 14 March 2024; VOA, ‘Blinken Says Haiti Transitional Council Will Take Charge Soon,’ 15 March 2024 The leader of the opposition Platfòm Pitit Desalin party, Jean Charles Moïse, initially rejected the initiative, claiming it was a solution imposed from outside the country, but eventually joined the council.18Juhakenson Blaise, ‘Pitit Desalin designates its member to the Caricom-endorsed presidential council,’ The Haitian Times; AP, ‘Haiti’s transitional council issues its first statement, signaling its creation is nearly complete,’ 27 March 2024
Despite Henry’s resignation and the setting of a transitional plan, gang violence continued at a high level in March. Compared with the previous month, violent events rose in the Port-au-Prince arrondissement. This violence also grew notably deadlier in the wealthy neighborhoods of Pétion-Ville, where the targeting of civilians reportedly led to at least 10 fatalities, doubling the number recorded in February. Police responded to the attacks with interventions in Pétion-Ville between 19 and 26 March that led to the reported deaths of about 20 gang members. Amid this chaos, ACLED records several vigilante incidents, with members of the Bwa Kale movement reportedly behind the lynching and killing of several gang members.19Harold Isaac and Ralph Tedy Erol, ‘Haiti gang leader killed as transition council nears completion,’ Reuters, 22 March 2024
Jamaica: Gang rivalries drive an increase in violence
Violence levels reached a peak in March in Westmoreland and Saint Catherine parishes, with at least 11 recorded events, contributing to a 36% general increase in violence in the country compared to the month prior. In Westmoreland, the increase was driven by a series of attacks by unidentified gang members that left six dead in March in Grange Hill and Little London municipalities. The attacks occur amid a dispute between the Ants Posse Gang and King Valley Gang for the control of criminal activities, including extortion and lottery scamming.20The Gleaner, ‘Gangsters again on the loose in volatile Grange Hill,’ 17 March 2024 Similarly, in Saint Catherine, targeted attacks against civilians prompted an increase in violence, including two attacks in Central Village between 11 and 12 March that resulted in five reported fatalities. In response to the increasing violence in the country, police have imposed several temporary curfews. In March, the government implemented curfews in sections of Westmoreland, Saint Catherine, Kingston, and Clarendon parishes.
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